Authenticated event intake, malformed-request rejection and stable-event duplicate protection.
Release record · 15 September 2026Show the work.
Show the work.
Label the limits.
This is the canonical public status record for Project Scarecrow. It separates working lab software from simulated behaviour, future requirements, external dependencies and field validation.
Current software release
Lab control plane v0.2
Lifecycle status: implemented. Evidence qualifier: automated-test passed on 15 September 2026. Deployment scope: local lab software, not a continuously operating farm service.
Local SQLite records for devices, events, incidents, operator actions and audit entries.
Device heartbeat, battery, signal, stale and degraded status.
Application-level tamper-evident audit hash chain and verification endpoint.
Evidence ZIP export with a per-file SHA-256 manifest.
Zones, contacts, permitted actions and local notifications; no external-delivery worker.
Public browser simulation from synthetic patrol event to a human response request.
Real camera, alarm, robot, drone, charging, navigation and physical emergency stop.
Automated evidence
Ten current tests, ten passes.
The test suite was run locally on 15 September 2026. It checks the lab gateway's software behaviour only. It does not prove device compatibility, farm uptime, detection accuracy, weather tolerance, legal admissibility or physical safety.
| Test area | What passed | What it does not prove |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Invalid event and operator credentials are rejected. | Production account management, MFA or internet hardening. |
| Idempotency | A repeated stable event ID does not create a second incident. | Vendor replay protection or high-volume behaviour. |
| Incident creation | Material synthetic events create human review records. | Detection accuracy from a real sensor. |
| Human decisions | Authorised classifications and notes are recorded. | Operator training quality or control-room performance. |
| Safety boundary | Unknown and autonomous-force actions are rejected. | Certified physical emergency-stop or actuator safety. |
| Configuration | Private zones, contacts and permitted actions persist. | Real site geometry, schedules or no-go maps. |
| Heartbeat | Battery, signal and degraded status are recorded. | Real device or network availability. |
| Notifications | Local notifications queue and acknowledge. | Email, SMS, WhatsApp or security-provider delivery. |
| Evidence export | A structured ZIP and SHA-256 manifest are generated. | Media chain of custody, signatures or trusted timestamps. |
| Audit tamper detection | A later row modification breaks the application hash chain. | Immutable storage or protection from database deletion/replacement. |
Source integrity record: gateway.py SHA-256 2378CA7571C96B4F04A59275AB723D73300FD96F1309B6934BB5EDBA0CFFFC53; test_gateway.py SHA-256 EC54A3C91987ACB449B9358F8E5F1B889BF235B597F9C49AD8B46F2562BA3498. Source remains in the controlled project vault while its public-release and licensing decision is reviewed.
Known limitations
No field claims are hiding behind the demo.
No connected hardware
There is no live camera, alarm, tower, quadruped, drone or deterrent. All current visual scenarios are synthetic.
No production identity system
The lab gateway uses a controlled operator key. Role accounts, MFA and partner access are planned.
No external alert delivery
A local queue exists. Email, SMS, WhatsApp and security-company workers do not.
No certified evidence chain
The hash chain detects row changes in one application database. It is not immutable, signed or independently timestamped.
No performance numbers
Accuracy, response time, availability, false alarms, maintenance burden and savings have not been field-validated.
No blanket approvals
Legal, PSiRA, POPIA, insurance, safety and aviation questions are mapped but require qualified review.
Active evidence gate
Connect one real, non-actuating input.
The sensible next step is a network camera, alarm or simple sensor bridge on a controlled site. Robot navigation follows only after the device contract, physical emergency stop, safe state and site boundaries are documented.
Select
Choose one input with a documented protocol, identity, heartbeat and support path.
Isolate
Build a vendor adapter that cannot bypass the incident and safety core.
Measure
Record latency, availability, tamper, power and loss-of-link behaviour.
Decide
Publish failures as well as passes before expanding the physical scope.
Public changelog
Release changes remain visible.
15 September 2026 · web release 4
Evidence precision and progressive visual layer
Added this status record, corrected the Stats SA source, separated lifecycle/dependency/evidence labels, clarified future resilience behaviour, added a self-hosted Three.js r186 concept scene, improved accessibility and introduced the bounded on-server public evidence interpreter.
15 September 2026 · pilot v0.2
Local evidence and health controls
Added device heartbeat, private configuration, local notification queue, evidence ZIP and SHA-256 manifest, audit-chain verification and ten automated tests.
14 September 2026 · initial public release
Truth-labelled concept and partner site
Published the public architecture, pilot, governance, evidence, partner, specifications, privacy, contact and press structure while preserving confidential source material outside the web root.