Non-lethal v1
The lab system and first field pilot exclude firearms, lethal payloads and autonomous force.
Scarecrow is being designed as assistive technology: machines observe, record and support; trained people retain authority, legal responsibility and the ability to stop the system.
The lab system and first field pilot exclude firearms, lethal payloads and autonomous force.
Consequential deterrence and response decisions require an authenticated, accountable person.
When communications, location, power or sensor confidence fail, the system reduces capability and raises attention.
Collect only what the defined security and pilot purpose needs. Routine surveillance is not a free secondary dataset.
Concept, implemented, demonstrated, planned and blocked work are labelled separately.
State-changing actions, configuration changes and evidence exports must identify who did what and when.
A secure system can still be unsafe. Scarecrow therefore treats physical behaviour, communications, human factors and software failure as one safety problem.
Current boundary: no live mobile platform or force-capable device is connected. A vendor-specific emergency stop and verified safe state are mandatory before physical movement enters a pilot.
The original impact-assessment draft identifies farmers, families, workers, contractors, visitors, drivers and suspected intruders as possible data subjects. The final lawful basis, notices and retention rules must be set for each deployment with qualified review.
Document the purpose, responsible party, operators, affected people and lawful basis before collection.
Aim cameras at necessary zones, avoid private interiors, mask public roads where practical and limit audio.
Use access control, encryption, network separation and logs for viewing, export and configuration.
Separate short-lived routine records from incident evidence and justify each retention period.
Maintain procedures for access, correction, deletion objections and security-compromise notification.
POPIA section 19 requires appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational safeguards, foreseeable-risk assessment, verification and updating of controls. Read the official Act.
The private threat model identifies remote takeover, disabled detection, device tampering, stolen footage and insider misuse as core scenarios. These are design inputs, not claims that the current prototype is production hardened.
Unique device identities, separate operator roles, rotation and revocation replace shared development keys before deployment.
Separate device control, video and management traffic; deny unsolicited inbound access; use an authenticated tunnel for remote services.
A camera adapter cannot gain route authority. A maintenance role cannot silently view all incident footage.
Updates and configurations require integrity verification, staged rollout, version history and rollback.
Audit records and exported evidence carry hashes so later alteration can be detected.
Threat modelling, vulnerability review, penetration testing and incident exercises must precede commercial operation.
If ROS 2 is selected for robotics, its official security tooling supports identities, permissions and encrypted communication through security keystores and enclaves. ROS 2 security documentation.
| Domain | Why it matters | Current project posture |
|---|---|---|
| Private Security Industry Regulation Act / PSiRA | Monitoring, response and security-service delivery may fall within regulated activity. | Technology-provider and registered-partner roles must be defined before a monitored service. |
| POPIA | Video, audio, identities, account data and location-linked records can be personal information. | Minimise, protect, log, retain for defined periods and contract with operators. |
| PAIA and evidence requests | Incident records may be requested or disclosed in legal, insurance or investigation processes. | Use a documented request, review and evidence-export process. |
| Occupational and public safety | Robots, towers, batteries, networks and maintenance introduce hazards to workers and visitors. | Site-specific risk assessment, signage, training, no-go zones and tested stops. |
| SACAA Part 101 pathway | Commercial or security-related unmanned-aircraft activity requires the applicable aviation pathway. | Drones are optional and outside the first pilot unless approved operators and aircraft are in place. |
| Criminal and civil law | Deterrence or physical intervention can create liability even when described as non-lethal. | Initial pilot limits behaviour to observation, lights, sirens and voice after legal and safety review. |
Record source, time, zone, device state and the minimum useful evidence.
Check expected people, vehicles, animals, schedules and available imagery.
Use agreed non-lethal warnings and call the responsible human response network.
Preserve evidence, document decisions, report failures and update configuration through change control.
Professional gate: the working legal, privacy, safety and incident documents are structured questions for counsel, PSiRA-aware partners, insurers and safety engineers. They are not legal opinions or operating approval.
See the partner roles